Gamma-spectrometry measurements of filtration media from an Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor.

Filtration media used to quantify particulate and gaseous releases have been collected from Hartlepool Power Station in the United Kingdom and measured using high-sensitivity gamma-spectrometry systems. Radionuclides that are relevant to the monitoring regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) have been detected. Results are reported and compared to detections recorded on the International Monitoring System (IMS). Time series activity plots have been produced and results interpreted with respect to known plant activities. The reported results improve the understanding of trace-level radionuclide emissions from Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs) and aid interpretation of IMS measurements. This work is being performed as part of the Xenon Environmental Nuclide Analysis at Hartlepool (XENAH) collaboration between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE, UK), EDF Energy (UK), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL, US) and the Swedish Defence Agency (FOI, Sweden).

Impacts of future nuclear power generation on the international monitoring system.

Many countries are considering nuclear power as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and the IAEA (IAEA, 2022) has forecasted nuclear power growth rates up to 224% of the 2021 level by 2050. Nuclear power plants release trace quantities of radioxenon, an inert gas that is also monitored because it is released during nuclear explosive tests. To better understand how nuclear energy growth (and resulting Xe emissions) could affect a global nonproliferation architecture, we modeled daily releases of radioxenon isotopes used for nuclear explosion detection in the International Monitoring System (IMS) that is part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: 131mXe, 133Xe, 133mXe, and 135Xe to examine the change in the number of potential radioxenon detections as compared to the 2021 detection levels. If a 40-station IMS network is used, the potential detections of 133Xe in 2050 would range from 82% for the low-power scenario to 195% for the high-power scenario, compared to the detections in 2021. If an 80-station IMS network is used, the potential detections of 133Xe in 2050 would range from 83% of the 2021 detection rate for the low-power scenario to 209% for the high-power scenario. Essentially no detections of 131mXe and 133mXe are expected. The high growth scenario could lead to a 2.5-fold increase in 135Xe detections, but the total number of detections is still small (on the order of 1 detection per day in the entire network). The higher releases do not pose a health issue, but better automated methods to discriminate between radioactive xenon released from industrial sources and nuclear explosions will be needed to offset the higher workload for people who perform the monitoring.

Comparison of source-location algorithms for atmospheric samplers.

Numerous algorithms have been developed to determine the source characteristics for an atmospheric radionuclide release, e.g., (Bieringer et al., 2017). This study compares three models that have been applied to the data collected by the International Monitoring System operated by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission to estimate source event parameters. Each model uses a different approach to estimate the parameters. A deterministic model uses a possible source region (PSR) approach (Ringbom et al., 2014) that is based on the correlation between predicted and measured sample values. A model (now called BAYEST) developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory uses a Bayesian formulation (Eslinger et al., 2019, 2020; Eslinger and Schrom, 2016). The FREAR model uses a different Bayesian formulation (De Meutter and Hoffman, 2020; De Meutter et al., 2021a, 2021b). The performance of the three source-location models is evaluated with 100 synthetic release cases for the single xenon isotope, 133Xe. The release cases resulted in detections in a fictitious network with 120 noble gas samplers. All three source-location models use the same sampling data. The two Bayesian models yield more accurate location estimates than the deterministic PSR model, with FREAR having slightly better location performance than BAYEST. Samplers with collection periods of 3, 6, 8, 12, and 24-h were used. Results from BAYEST show that location accuracy improves with each reduction in sample collection length. The BAYEST model is slightly better for estimating the start time of the release. The PSR model has about the same spread in start times as the FREAR model, but the PSR results have a better average start time. The Bayesian source-location algorithms give more accurate results than the PSR approach, and provide release magnitude estimates, while the base PSR model does not estimate the release magnitude. This investigation demonstrates that a reasonably dense sampling grid will sometimes yield poor location and time estimates regardless of the model. The poor estimates generally coincide with cases where there is a much larger distance between the release point and the first detecting sampler than the average sampler spacing.

A baseline for source localisation using the inverse modelling tool FREAR.

A global network of monitoring stations is set up that can measure tiny concentrations of airborne radioactivity as part of the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. If Treaty-relevant detections are made, inverse atmospheric transport modelling is one of the methods that can be used to determine the source of the radioactivity. In order to facilitate the testing of novel developments in inverse modelling, two sets of test cases are constructed using real-world 133Xe detections associated with routine releases from a medical isotope production facility. One set consists of 24 cases with 5 days of observations in each case, and another set consists of 8 cases with 15 days of observations in each case. A series of inverse modelling techniques and several sensitivity experiments are applied to determine the (known) location of the medical isotope production facility. Metrics are proposed to quantify the quality of the source localisation. Finally, it is illustrated how the sets of test cases can be used to test novel developments in inverse modelling algorithms.

Examining the potential for detecting simultaneous noble gas and aerosol samples in the international monitoring system radionuclide network.

The purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to establish a legally binding ban on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) is developing the International Monitoring System (IMS) that includes a global network of 80 stations to monitor for airborne radionuclides upon entry into force of the CTBT. All 80 radionuclide stations will monitor for particulate radionuclides and at least half of the stations will monitor for radioxenon. The airborne radionuclide monitoring is an important verification technology both for the detection of a radionuclide release and in the determination of whether the release event originates from a nuclear explosion as opposed to an industrial use of nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants and many medical isotope production facilities release radioxenon into the atmosphere. Low levels of a few particulate isotopes, such as iodine, may also be released. Detections of multiple isotopes are useful for screening the radionuclide samples for relevance to the Treaty. This paper examines the anticipated joint detections in the IMS of noble gas and particulate isotopes from underground nuclear explosions where breaches in the underground containment vents from low levels to up to 1% of the radionuclide inventory of the resulting fission products to the atmosphere. Detection probabilities are based on 844 simulated release events spaced out at 17 release locations and one year in time. Six different release (venting) scenarios, including two fractionated scenarios, were analyzed. When ranked by detection probability, 11 particulate isotopes and one noble gas isotope (133Xe) appear in the top 20 isotopes for all six release scenarios. Using the 11 particulate isotopes and the one noble gas isotope, the IMS has nearly the same detection probability as when 45 particulate and 4 noble gas isotopes are used. Thus, a limited list of relevant radionuclides may be sufficient for treaty verification purposes. The probability that at least one particulate and at least one radioxenon isotope would be detected in the IMS from the release events ranged from 0.15 to 0.86 depending on the release scenario.

Radionuclide measurements of the international monitoring system.

The International Monitoring System (IMS) is a unique global network of sensors, tuned to measure various phenomenology, with the common goal of detecting a nuclear explosion anywhere in the world. One component of this network collects measurements of radioactive particulates and gases (collectively known as radionuclides) present in the atmosphere; through this, compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) can be verified. The radionuclide sub-network consists of 120 sensors across 80 locations, supported by 16 measurement laboratories. All radionuclide stations make use of a form of γ-ray spectroscopy to measure radionuclides from samples; this remains largely unchanged since the network was first established 25 years ago. Advances in sampling and spectroscopy systems can yield improvements to the sensitivity of the network to detect a nuclear explosion. This paper summarises the status of the IMS radionuclide network, the current suite of technology used and reviews new technology that could enhance future iterations, potentially improving the verification power of the IMS.

Investigation on atmospheric radioactivity sample association using consistency with isotopic ratio decay over time at IMS radionuclide stations.

For the enhancement of the International Data Centre's products, specifically the Standard Screened Radionuclide Event Bulletin, an important step is to establish methods to associate the detections of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty-relevant nuclides in different atmospheric radioactivity samples with the same radionuclide release to characterize its source for the purpose of nuclear explosion monitoring. Episodes of anomalously high activity concentrations in samples at the International Monitoring System radionuclide stations are used as the primary assumption for being related to the same release. For multiple isotope observations, the consistency of their isotopic ratios in subsequent samples with radioactive decay is another plausible hint for one unique release. The radioxenon observations that are associated with the nuclear test announced by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2013 serve as case study to demonstrate the effectiveness of this basic approach and how the additionally associated samples improve the source location. We use two distinct puff releases, both of short duration, for the atmospheric transport modelling simulations to gain further evidence and confidence in our sample association study by identifying the air masses that link the releases to multiple samples. This basic approach will support the definition of analysis procedures and criteria for automatic sample association to be implemented in the Standard Screened Radionuclide Event Bulletin, which is of relevance for an expert technical analysis.

Short-lived noble gas effluent trends from a research reactor.

An understanding of anthropogenic sources of radioactive noble gases in the atmosphere is needed to enhance the discrimination ability of the International Monitoring System's sensors. These sources include commercial and research nuclear reactors and medical isotope production facilities. While abiding by local environmental ordinances these facilities all emit noble gas radioisotopes through normal operation. This research presents measurements and analysis of noble gas isotopes (41Ar, 135Xe, 135mXe, 137Xe, 138Xe, 87Kr, 88Kr, and 89Kr) made directly at the stack of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The Xe and Kr noble gases are concurrently observed with 41Ar, a neutron activation product, when the reactor is operational. The magnitude of the Xe and Kr noble gases released is not constant over the HFIR cycle, but they temporally match the 41Ar trend. An isotope activity ratio analysis of these shorter lived isotopes combined with the observation of the cycle's temporal trend helps understand the noble gas production mechanism at the HFIR. Isotopes with short half-lives are not useful for long-range environmental monitoring. However, these measurements could potentially be combined with atmospheric modeling to predict the background source term of the longer-lived Xe ratios at a monitoring station.

Addressing the quantification of meteorological uncertainties in the atmospheric transport simulations of the 133Xe industrial background.

The French National Data Center (NDC) uses an automated simulation of the 133Xe worldwide atmospheric background as one of the means to categorize the radionuclide measurements of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) International Monitoring System (IMS). These simulations take into account 133Xe releases from the known or assumed major industrial emitters in the world and global-scale meteorological data. However, a quantification of the simulation uncertainties in this operational set up is yet to be addressed. This work discusses the benefits of meteorological ensemble data as available from National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) for that purpose. For this study, the daily dispersion of releases from the Institute for Radio Elements (IRE), a medical isotope production facility located in Fleurus (Belgium), was calculated over one year with emissions measured in-site and ensemble meteorological data. The ensemble contains 31 members, which resulted in as many predictions of activity concentration for any given time and place. The resulting distribution statistics (mean, median and spread), and the control run, were confronted to the deterministic run and to measurements at one IMS-like station near Paris (France) and one IMS station in Freiburg (Germany). Overall, the ensemble results have decreased the simulation performance, as expected given the use of meteorological analyses only. However, contrasting patterns were found with a detailed analysis of daily activity concentration over two one-month-and-a-half periods. Noticeably, outlier results were found to carry the best forecast in some significant detections, proving their relevance for the measurement categorization, despite their isolated character. Importantly, the ensemble has allowed the quantification of meteorological uncertainties, which was beneficial in all cases. It either has improved the confidence of IMS data categorization or has pointed to low confidence predictions. A criterion to identify the latter is suggested, based on information provided by the ensemble distributions. In addition, maps of probability of detections and of relative spread are suggested to show additional benefits of ensemble meteorology.

SAUNA III - The next generation noble gas system for verification of nuclear explosions.

The SAUNA III represent the next generation of the SAUNA systems designed for detection of low levels of radioactive xenon in the atmosphere, with the main purpose of detecting underground nuclear explosions. The system automatically collects, processes and measures 40 m3 atmospheric samples every 6 h, increasing both the sensitivity and time resolution as compared the systems currently in use. The higher sensitive increases the number of detections, especially for samples were more than one isotope of xenon are detected. This improves the understanding of the background and the possibility to screen out signal from civilian sources. The increased time resolution of the new system also provides a more detailed picture of the plumes, especially important for near-by sources. The design of the system as well as data from the first two years of operation are presented.

SAUNA QB - Array: The realization of a new concept in radioxenon detection.

We introduce a new concept in radioxenon detection - the radioxenon Array, defined as a system where air sampling and activity measurement is performed at multiple locations, using measurement units that are less sensitive, but on the other hand less costly, and easier to install and operate, compared to current state-of-the-art radioxenon systems. The inter-unit distance in the Array is typically hundreds of kilometres. Using synthetic nuclear explosions together with a parametrized measurement system model, we argue that, when such measurement units are combined into an Array, the aggregated verification performance (detection, location, and characterization) can be high. The concept has been realized by developing a measurement unit named SAUNA QB, and the world's first radioxenon Array is now operating in Sweden. The operational principles and performance of the SAUNA QB and the Array is described, and examples of first measured data are presented, indicating a measurement performance according to expectations.

Thermodynamic determination of condensation behavior for the precursory elements of radioxenon following an underground nuclear explosion.

The measurement of radioactive xenon isotopes (radioxenon) in the atmosphere is a tool used to detect underground nuclear explosions, provided that some radioxenon escaped containment and that fractionation leading to the alteration of the relative proportions of these isotopes, is accounted for. After the explosion, volatilization followed by melting of the surrounding rocks produces a magma where the more refractory radioactive species get dissolved while the more volatile ones contribute to the gas phase that might escape. Indium, tin, antimony, tellurium and iodine are the main fission products involved in the decay chains leading to radioxenon. In this study, condensation as a function of temperature for these precursors of radioxenon were determined using thermodynamic calculations for systems with complex chemical composition corresponding to major environments of known underground nuclear explosions and for a range of pressure values representative of the cavity evolution. Our results illustrate a large difference between the relevant condensation temperatures for the radioxenon precursors and the tabulated boiling temperatures of the pure compounds often used as indicators of their volatility. For some precursory elements such as tin, the often-considered Heaviside function represents an oversimplification of the concept of condensation temperature, as condensation occurs over a temperature range as large as 2000 K. This results from the speciation of the elements in the gas phase mainly driven by the formation of oxides. Condensation also strongly depends on pressure while it moderately depends on the bulk chemical composition of the system. This study shows the importance and complexity of the condensation process following underground nuclear explosions. It also shows how thermodynamic computations allow the prediction of the quantity and the relative proportions of radioactive xenon isotopes in the gas phase in the presence of magma, before their potential emission to the atmosphere. Better detection, discrimination and understanding of underground nuclear explosions should arise by taking into account the fractionation resulting from the condensation of the radionuclides producing radioxenon in nuclear cavities.

Global emission inventory of 131mXe, 133Xe, 133mXe, and 135Xe from all kinds of nuclear facilities for the reference year 2014.

Global radioactivity monitoring for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) includes the four xenon isotopes 131mXe, 133Xe, 133mXe and 135Xe. These four isotopes are serving as important indicators of nuclear explosions. The state-of-the-art radioxenon emission inventory uses generic release estimates for each known nuclear facility. However, the release amount can vary by several orders of magnitude from year to year. The year 2014 was selected for a single year radioxenon emission inventory with minimized uncertainty. Whenever 2014 emissions reported by the facility operator are available these are incorporated into the 2014 emission inventory. This paper summarizes this new emission inventory. The emissions are compared with previous studies. The global radioxenon emission inventory for 2014 can be used for studies to estimate the contribution of this anthropogenic source to the observed ambient concentrations at IMS noble gas sensors to support CTBT monitoring activities, including calibration and performance assessment of the verification system as described in the Treaty as well as developing and validating methods for enhanced detection capabilities of signals that may indicate a nuclear test. One specific application is the 1st Nuclear Explosion Signal Screening Open Inter-Comparison Exercise announced end of 2021.

Set up and test of an anticoincidence system for the detection of radioactive xenon by gamma spectrometry system.

The aim of this work is based on the optimisation of a gamma spectrometry system in anticoincidence for the detection of noble gases, in particular the radioactive isotopes of xenon. These four radionuclides are of particular interest for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Laboratory of the ENEA Research Centre of Brasimone, where the experimental apparatus has been set up to carry out the measurements of 131mXe, 133Xe, 133mXe and 135Xe, is able to provide, if necessary, data and analysis on noble gases. The apparatus provides for the sampling of outdoor air, the passage through filters and in activated carbons maintained at cryogenic temperatures to allow xenon absorption. Finally, gas extraction and xenon volumes are analyzed by means of gas chromatography and a thermal conductivity detector. At the end of the extraction an aluminium cylinder containing radioxenon is analyzed by high resolution gamma spectroscopy using a High Purity Germanium Detector P-type. The signals produced by the interaction of cosmic rays with the crystal have been recognized as the main cause of the increase of the detector background because they give rise to the Compton continuum and, as a result, they affect the value of the minimum detectable activity (MDA). In order to overcome this effect, a system in anticoincidence has been developed using two plastic scintillators, placed over the shielding of the HPGe detector, which send pulses recording within a time delay window located in the germanium multichannel analyzer: at the time the signal arrives from the scintillator, the gate blocks data acquisition to avoid recording pulses generated by cosmic radiation. For both configurations of the system (with and without the anticoincidence apparatus operating) the energy, and efficiency calibrations have been carried out using a certified multigamma-ray calibration source to assess the performance.

A new algorithm for estimating radioxenon concentrations.

A new algorithm (Xcounts) is introduced for estimating the activity concentrations of the xenon isotopes 131mXe, 133mXe, 133Xe, and 135Xe using beta-gamma coincidence data. The algorithm simultaneously estimates the decay counts associated with the four xenon isotopes, background, and radon in contrast to the net-counts method that uses sequential residual removal to account for background and interferences. Calibration data for background counts are determined from gas-background measurements and simulation. In Xcounts, the false positive count rates for 131mXe and 133mXe are lower than those for 133Xe and 135Xe. This algorithm appears to reliably detect the metastable isotopes at lower activity levels than the net-counts method and have similar performance for the other isotopes.

Projected network performance for next generation aerosol monitoring systems.

Aerosol monitoring for radioactivity is a mature and proven technology. However, by improving key specifications of aerosol monitoring equipment, more samples per day can be collected and analyzed with the same minimum detectable concentrations as current systems. This work models hypothetical releases of 140Ba and 131I over a range of magnitudes corresponding to the inventory produced from the fission of about 100 g to 1 kiloton TNT-equivalent of 235U. The releases occur over an entire year to incorporate the natural variability in atmospheric transport. Sampling equipment located at the 79 locations for radionuclide stations identified in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) for the International Monitoring System are used to determine the detections of the individual releases. Alternative collection schemes in next generation equipment that collect 2, 3, or 4 samples per day, rather than the current 1 sample per day, would result in detections in many more samples at more stations with detections for a given release level. The authors posit that next generation equipment will result in increased network resilience to outages and improved source-location capability for lower yield source releases. The application of dual-detector and coincidence measurements to these systems would significantly boost sensitivity for some isotopes and would further enhance the monitoring capability.

Impact of industrial nuclear emissions on nuclear explosion monitoring.

In 1995, the development of a global radioactive xenon monitoring network was discussed in the Conference on Disarmament as part of a nuclear explosion verification regime. Discussions considered different network densities and different possible source magnitudes. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was subsequently written to initially include 40 locations for noble gas (radioxenon) samplers, and to consider using a total of 80 locations for noble gas samplers in its International Monitoring System (IMS) after the treaty enters into force. Since 2000, a global network of noble gas monitoring locations has been built as part of the IMS. This network, currently with 31 locations, is of sufficient sensitivity to discover that the Earth's atmosphere contains a complex anthropogenic radioactive xenon background. In this work, the impact of calculated xenon backgrounds on IMS radionuclide stations is determined by atmospheric transport modeling over a period of two years using global average values. The network coverage for potential nuclear explosions is based on a proposed method for finding anomalies among frequent background signals. Even with the addition of background radioxenon sources and using a conservative anomaly-based approach, this work shows that various network configurations have higher xenon coverage than the estimates developed when the IMS network was designed in 1995. While these global xenon coverage figures are better than expected when the network was designed in 1995, the regional impact of background radioxenon sources is large, especially for smaller source magnitudes from potential nuclear explosions, and in some cases the xenon background vastly reduces the coverage value of individual sampling locations. The results show the detection capability and presents an optimal installation order of noble gas sampling locations, e.g. from 40 to 80, after the treaty enters into force.

Overview of temporary radioxenon background measurement campaigns conducted for the CTBTO between 2008 and 2018.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) specifies that an overall network of at least 40 International Monitoring System (IMS) stations should monitor the presence of radioxenon in the atmosphere upon its entry into force. The measurement of radioxenon concentrations in the air is one of the major techniques to detect underground nuclear explosions. It is, together with radionuclide particulate monitoring, the only component of the network able to confirm whether an event originates from a nuclear test, leaving the final proof to on-site inspection. Correct and accurate interpretation of radioxenon detections by State Signatories is a key parameter of the verification regime of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). In this context, the discrimination between the highly variable radioxenon background generated by normal operations of nuclear facilities and CTBT-relevant events is a challenging, but critical, task. To this end, the radioxenon background that can be expected at IMS noble gas systems must be sufficiently characterized and understood. All activities conducted to study the global radioxenon background are focused on the calibration and performance of the verification system as described in the Treaty. The unique CTBTO noble gas system network is designed to optimally covering the globe. By the end of 2019, 31 systems were put in operation, 25 of which being already certified. It took two decades from the first experimental setup of noble gas system in the field to reach this stage of maturity. In the meantime, it was an urgent need to gain empirical evidence of atmospheric radioxenon concentrations with the full spectrum of characteristics that IMS noble gas systems may be observing. This experience was significantly advanced through temporary measurement campaigns. Their objective was to gain the additional necessary knowledge for a correct understanding and categorization of radioxenon detections. The site selection for these campaigns put emphasis on regions with low coverage by the initially few experimental noble gas systems at IMS locations or where potential interferences with normal background might be observed. Short-term measurements were first initiated in 2008. Sites of potential interest were identified, and campaigns up to few weeks were performed. Based on the findings of these short campaigns, transportable systems were procured by the CTBTO. Longer temporary measurement campaigns were started afterwards and operated by local hosts in different regions of the globe. Site selections were based on purely scientific criteria. Objectives of the measurement campaigns were continually reassessed, and projects were designed to meet the scientific needs for radioxenon background understanding as required for nuclear explosion monitoring. As of today, several thousands of samples have been collected and measured. Spectra of temporary measurement campaigns were (and are still) analysed in the International Data Centre (IDC). As they are not part of the CTBT monitoring system, no IDC product is generated. Analysis results are stored in a non-operational database of the CTBTO and made available, together with raw data, to authorized users of States Signatories through a Secure Web Portal (SWP) and to scientific institutions for approved research projects through a virtual Data Exploitation Centre (vDEC) after signing a cost-free confidentiality agreement (https://www.ctbto.org/specials/vdec). This paper aims at providing an overview of the temporary measurement campaigns conducted by the CTBTO since the very first field measurements. It lays out scientific results in a systematic approach. This overview demonstrates the asset of radioxenon background measurement data that have been collected with a wide variety of characteristics that may be observed at IMS stations. It bears a tremendous opportunity for development, enhancement and validation of methodologies for CTBT monitoring. In 2018, a campaign started in Japan with transportable noble gas systems in the vicinity of the IMS station RN38 in Takasaki. It will be described separately once the measurements are completed.

Phase II testing of Xenon International on Mount Schauinsland, Germany.

Station RN33 on Mount Schauinsland near Freiburg, Germany, is part of the International Monitoring System monitoring radioxenon in air (131mXe, 133Xe, 133mXe, and 135Xe) for verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Here, we present data from phase II testing of a new system, Xenon International at RN33, July 14th, 2021 to Jan 22nd, 2022, together with SPALAX data from the same time period. Radioxenon could be detected in 473 of 719 samples, among them many multiple isotope detections. Activity concentrations of spiked and selected environmental samples were verified by laboratory reanalysis. The sensitivity of Xenon International for radioxenons is up to one order of magnitude better for the metastable isotopes than that of the SPALAX, with a shorter sampling duration of 6 h.

Future development of global molybdenum-99 production and saving of atmospheric radioxenon emissions by using nuclear fusion-based approaches.

Technetium-99m, the decay product of molybdenum-99, is the most used medical isotope in diagnostic imaging. The future disruptions of molybdenum-99 supply, due to the final shut down of some old producing reactors, has led some current global supplies to plan the expansion of their production capacity. While other countries are developing own production facilities to supply their domestic demand. The global increase of molybdenum-99 production in the coming years could increase by about five times the current demand, with about the 50 percent of additional production in North America. Xenon radionuclides are an inevitable by-product of the nuclear plants production, and their periodically release into the atmosphere, contribute to the background that is also revealed by the IMS stations of the CBTO treaty. In this framework, the development of new technologies, posing no risk in relation to nuclear proliferation and do not result in emissions of radioxenon, could mitigate the issues related to the forecast increase of molybdenum-99 production worldwide. In Italy, an alternative 99Mo production project, the project ENEA Sorgentina, based on the irradiation of molybdenum by neutrons produced by a deuterium-tritium nuclear fusion process, is under development. This facility will not release radioxenon into the atmosphere, so it will not affect the background value in the atmosphere in Southern Europe.